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The South African Civil Union Act 17 of 2006: A Good 
Example of the Dangers of Rushing the Legislative 
Process
‡
 
 
Bradley S. Smith  and J.A. Robinson  
 
I.  SETTING THE SCENE—A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
 
The 27th of April 1994 heralded the dawning of a new era for the 
Republic of South Africa. On this date, the interim Constitution
1
 came 
into operation and for the first time in its history the Republic was to be 
governed by a democratic constitutional dispensation, which ousted 
parliamentary sovereignty in favour of constitutional supremacy. The 
thrust of this new era was illustrated by the preamble of the interim 
Constitution which stated: 
 
[T]here is a need to create a new order in which all South Africans will 
be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and 
democratic constitutional state in which there is equality between men 
and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall be able to 
enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms . . . . 
 
The cornerstone
2
 of this ―new order‖ was a Bill of Rights, one of the 
most fundamental rights being the right to equality. The interim 
 
‡ This paper was presented by Bradley Smith as part of a ―Symposium on Same-Sex Marriage and 
Gay Adoptions: Inclusion, Compromise, Protection, and Consequences‖ on November 2, 2007, at 
the J. Reuben Clark Law School on the campus of Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. It 
constitutes an abridged version of Bradley S. Smith & J.A. Robinson, The South African Civil Union 
Act 17 of 2006: Progressive legislation with regressive implications?, 3 INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & FAMILY. 
(forthcoming 2008). This abridged version has been published with the kind permission of the 
editorial board of the latter journal. As such, this adaptation includes a number of excerpts from and 
references to the original article. For the sake of completeness, readers are encouraged to refer to the 
original version. The authors are greatly indebted to the editorial board of the INT‘L J.L. POL‘Y & 
FAMILY for this concession. 
 Senior lecturer, Department of Private Law, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South 
Africa.  This paper forms part of an LL.D study that is currently in progress. 
 Professor of Private Law, University of the North West, Potchefstroom, South Africa. 
 
 1. S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 (repealed 1996). 
 2. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 7 (repealing the interim Constitution, see infra note 1). This 
section states ―[the Bill of Rights] enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.‖ 
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Constitution was replaced
3
 by the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (―the Constitution‖), and the right to equality is currently 
contained in section 9 of the Constitution. According to section 9, the 
basic premise of this right is that ―[e]veryone is equal before the law and 
has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.‖4 Section 9 also 
states that neither the state nor any person may discriminate unfairly, 
either directly or indirectly, against anyone on a number of listed 
grounds,
5
 which include race, gender, sexual orientation, and marital 
status. Discrimination on any of these listed grounds is presumed to be 
unfair, unless proven otherwise. 
The South African Bill of Rights also makes express provision for a 
number of other fundamental rights, such as the right to life,
6
 the right to 
human dignity,
7
 the right to freedom and security of the person,
8
 the right 
to freedom of expression,
9
 and the right to privacy.
10
 The rights 
contained in the Bill are, however, not absolute and may be limited in 
accordance with section 36 of the Constitution (the so-called ―limitation 
clause‖).11 
As can be expected, the advent of a democratic constitutional order 
bolstered by a comprehensive Bill of Rights had an enormous and 
instantaneous impact on almost every facet of South African life, law, 
and culture. One of the most dramatic and far-reaching of these was 
occasioned by the newly-created Constitutional Court, which, in its 
capacity as South Africa‘s highest court in all constitutional matters, 
wasted no time in abolishing the death penalty in 1995.
12
 The legal 
development of human rights in South Africa was by no means limited to 
criminal law but also extended to private law and family law issues as 
well. The purpose of this paper is to examine a number of legislative and 
judicial developments which have occurred in South Africa since 1994 
 
 3. The interim Constitution was transitional in nature and was enacted with a view towards 
the eventual promulgation of a ―final‖ Constitution, the text for which was approved on May 8, 
1996. When it came into operation on February 4, 1997, this ―final‖ Constitution repealed the 
interim Constitution and ―complete[d] South Africa‘s constitutional revolution.‖ IAIN CURRIE AND 
JOHAN DE WAAL, THE BILL OF RIGHTS HANDBOOK 6 (5th ed. 2005). 
 4. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(1).  
 5. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(3). The grounds listed in section 9(3) are race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth. 
 6. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 11. 
 7. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10 (―Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected.‖). 
 8. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 12. 
 9. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 16. 
 10. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 14. 
 11. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36. 
 12. S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 419] THE SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL UNION ACT 17 OF 2006 421 
and to evaluate the efficacy of recent civil union legislation in light of 
these developments. To this end the concept of ―marriage‖ and its 
evolution will be tracked in Part II, followed by an analysis of 
interpretative difficulties and other anomalous consequences occasioned 
by the promulgation of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (―Civil Union 
Act‖)  in Parts III and IV. Finally, Part V concludes that the drafters of 
the Civil Union Act paid scant regard to the comprehensive research that 
had been conducted by the South African Law Reform Commission in 
the decade preceding the Civil Union Act, with the result that same-sex 
cohabitants are currently afforded better legal protection than their 
heterosexual peers. 
 
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
CHALLENGES TO ITS STATUS AND DEFINITION 
 
A.  Marriage Under Attack 
 
Prior to the democratic constitutional era, civil marriage (that is, a 
marriage in terms of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (―Marriage Act‖)) 
between two heterosexual persons was the only family form recognized 
by South African law.
13
 Interestingly, the Marriage Act did not contain a 
definition of the concept of marriage, which meant courts had to use the 
common law
14
 to define marriage. 
In Ismail v Ismail,
15
 the Appellate Division (which was the highest 
Court in South Africa at the time) defined marriage in terms of the 
common law as being ―the legally recognized voluntary union for life of 
one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others while it lasts.‖ 
This definition shows that civil marriage was viewed and regulated from 
an exclusively Westernized point of view.
16
 Two of the most noticeable 
deficiencies of this rigid approach were (1) the blanket non-recognition 
of polygynous
17
 marriages and (2) relationships between extra-marital 
 
 13. See SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, PROJECT 118: REPORT ON DOMESTIC 
PARTNERSHIPS, xi, 3 (2006), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports 
/r_prj118_2006march.pdf; see also Nat‘l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) ¶ 36 (S. Afr.). 
 14. The common law can be loosely defined as the body of law that is not found in South 
African legislation and which is derived chiefly from Roman-Dutch law. H.R. HAHLO & E. KAHN, 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS BACKGROUND 132 (1968). 
 15. 1983 (1) SA 1006 (A) at 1019 (H) (S.Afr); see also Seedat‘s Ex‘rs v The Master (Natal) 
1917 A.D. 302, 309 (S. Afr.) (―With us marriage is the union of one man with one woman, to the 
exclusion while it lasts of all others.‖). 
 16. J.A. Robinson, The Evolution of the Concept of Marriage in South Africa, 26 OBITER 
488, 488–93 (2005). 
 17. For the purposes of South African law, it is more correct to use the term ―polygyny‖ (i.e., 
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cohabitants (both heterosexual and homosexual) received minimal legal 
recognition. 
The absence of legal recognition of polygynous marriages was 
especially problematic as polygyny constitutes an important cultural 
aspect for many indigenous black people of Southern Africa. Polygynous 
marriages are also often encountered in (purely religious as opposed to 
civil) marriages that have been concluded according to the Islamic faith. 
This lacuna was partially addressed by the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (―Customary Marriages Act‖) which came 
into operation on December 15, 2000.
18
 As suggested by its title, this Act 
provides for full legal recognition of marriages concluded in accordance 
with customary law. ―Customary law‖ is defined by the Customary 
Marriages Act as ―the customs and usages traditionally observed among 
the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of 
the culture of those peoples.‖19 
The second problem (namely minimal legal recognition for extra-
marital cohabitation) manifested itself in many ways. Examples of the 
differentiation between cohabitants and spouses include (i) that 
cohabitants did not automatically inherit intestate from one another in the 
absence of a valid will in which the survivor was benefited, (ii) that 
cohabitants were not placed under any legal obligation to maintain one 
another either during or after the termination of their relationship, and 
(iii) that cohabitants were not subjected to (or protected by) the various 
matrimonial property regimes that were available to married couples.
20
 In 
short, the rights and duties that were attached to marriage by operation of 
law
21
 did not apply to cohabitants unless they had contracted to this 
effect or unless they were specifically included within the ambit of 
legislation (a situation which was the exception rather than the rule).
22
 
 
the situation where one man may be married to more than one woman simultaneously) rather than 
―polygamy‖ (i.e., where one or more wife or husband is permitted simultaneously). 
 18. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.). 
 19. Id. § 1. Islamic and Hindu marriages are therefore not included within the ambit of this 
Act, but the South African Law Reform Commission has prepared a draft Muslim Marriages Bill (as 
part of its Project 106 Islamic Marriages and Related Matters Report) which might, in the future, 
pave the way for full legal recognition of Islamic marriages. The possible recognition of these 
marriages is complicated by the conflicting constitutional values of the right to freedom of religion 
and the right to equality on the basis of gender. See D.S.P. CRONJÉ & JACQUELINE HEATON, SOUTH 
AFRICAN FAMILY LAW, 222–223 (2d ed. 2004) (for a brief exposition of this issue). 
 20. See Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡. 
 21. These included consortium omnis vitae and its attendant rights and obligations such as 
the privilege relating to marital communication which entails that although spouses are competent to 
do so, they generally cannot be compelled to testify against one another. See Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977 § 195 (S. Afr.) (containing this principle and applicable exceptions). 
 22. An example occurs in the case of domestic violence, where the Domestic Violence Act 
116 of 1998 (S. Afr.) categorically provides for domestic relationships where the persons ―[whether 
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Although this rigid Calvinistic approach towards the law of marriage 
dictated the course of South African family law for almost 350 years, the 
coming into operation of the Bill of Rights signified impending change. 
When viewed against the backdrop of the rights to equality
23
 and human 
dignity
24
 as guaranteed by the then newly-adopted Constitution, it was 
clear that the pre-1994 South African definition of marriage would not 
pass Constitutional muster, and a more pluralistic and inclusive family 
law system would be demanded of a society which subscribed to the 
―democratic values of human dignity, equality, and freedom.‖25 Societal 
groups that had faced a history of marginalization, such as gays and 
lesbians, were quick to approach the Courts in order to challenge the 
legal legacy left by pre-democratic South Africa. For example, in the 
1998 decision of National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v 
Minister of Justice the Constitutional Court abolished the common law 
crime of sodomy on the basis that it violated the rights to equality, 
human dignity, and privacy.
26
 Two years later, in National Coalition for 
Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs and Another the 
same Court found that section 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 
(―Aliens Control Act‖) discriminated against partners in permanent 
same-sex life partnerships as it only provided for the spouses of 
permanent South African residents to apply for immigration permits.
27
 In 
consequence of this finding, the Court ordered that the words ―or partner, 
in a permanent same-sex life partnership‖ would henceforth be read into 
the Act after the word ―spouse‖ to remedy this defect.28 
As will be seen in this paper, a number of other piecemeal 
developments pertaining to same- and opposite-sex couples also took 
place by way of the Courts. These developments attempted to give effect 
to family law relations between unmarried couples. However, despite 
these ad hoc developments, civil marriage remained an institution 
reserved solely for two heterosexual persons who had elected to marry in 
terms of the Marriage Act. It was therefore clear from the outset that it 
 
they are of the same or of the opposite sex] live or lived together in a relationship in the nature of 
marriage, although they are not, or were not, married to each other, or are not able to be married to 
each other.‖ 
 23. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9; see discussion supra Part I. 
 24. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10. 
 25. Id. § 7. 
 26. 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 27. 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (citing Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 § 25(5) (S. Afr.) 
(stating that ―a regional committee may, upon application by the spouse or the dependent child of a 
person permanently and lawfully resident in the Republic, authorize the issue of an immigration 
permit‖)). 
 28. Nat‘l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1, 45 (CC) 
(S. Afr.). 
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was only a matter of time before same-sex couples would approach the 
Courts for an answer to the million dollar question as to whether or not 
the law could continue to deny them the right to marry one another. 
In 2002, Marié Fourie and Cecilia Bonthuys, a lesbian couple living 
in Pretoria, approached the High Court for an order directing the Minister 
of Home Affairs to register their marriage in terms of the Marriage Act.
29
 
After a long and drawn-out legal battle involving a number of appeals 
and cross-appeals conducted before the full spectrum of higher Courts in 
South Africa, the couple eventually found themselves litigating in the 
Constitutional Court—a step which would finally provide a definitive 
answer to the question as to whether or not same-sex couples would be 
permitted to marry one another in South Africa.
30
 
On December 1, 2005, the Constitutional Court delivered its 
judgment in the matter of Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie 
and Another finding in favour of the couple and holding (i) that the 
common law definition of marriage was unconstitutional to the extent 
that it did not allow for same-sex couples to enjoy the rights and 
obligations of marriage, and (ii) that section 30(1) of the Marriage Act 
was unconstitutional to the extent that it did not provide a gender-neutral 
marriage formula which could encompass same-sex marriages.
31
 
Despite this finding, the majority of the Constitutional Court opted 
not to make these orders enforceable immediately, but instead gave 
Parliament a period of one year from the date of the judgment to 
promulgate legislation which would remedy the deficiencies.
32
 If 
Parliament failed to meet the deadline of November 30, 2006, the Court 
held that the words ―or spouse‖ would simply be read into section 30(1) 
of the Marriage Act, thereby providing a marriage formula that was wide 
enough to encompass the conclusion of same-sex marriages.
33
 The 
Legislature responded to the Fourie case by enacting the Civil Union Act 
17 of 2006 (―Civil Union Act‖). 
 
 
 
 
 29. Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another No. 17280/02 (Transvaal 
High Ct. Oct. 18, 2002) (S. Afr.) (unreported decision). 
 30. Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another, 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) 531–
39 (S. Afr.). 
 31. Id. at 584. 
 32. In her minority judgment, Judge O‘Regan did not disagree with the merits of Judge 
Sach‘s findings, but simply felt that the declarations of invalidity should be made effective 
immediately instead of being suspended for the one year period. Id. at 584–90 (O‘Regan, J., 
concurring). 
 33. Id. at 586. 
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B.  The Legislature’s Response to the Fourie Case 
 
As seen above, the Fourie case charged the Legislature with the 
unenviable task of legislating a highly contentious and emotional issue—
namely the legal regulation of same-sex marriage. The difficulty of this 
assignment was clear from the start. The first Civil Union Bill attempted 
to make provision for the conclusion of ―civil unions‖ without calling 
these unions ―marriages.‖34 The bill provided for a ―civil union‖ to take 
the form of either a ―civil partnership‖ (which could be concluded by 
same-sex couples only and which would make all the legal consequences 
of civil marriage available to such couples) or a ―domestic partnership‖ 
(which provided for the extension of certain consequences of civil 
marriage to be extended to the domestic partners and was available to 
either hetero- or homosexual couples).
35
 
The use of terms such as ―civil partnership‖ was not received 
favourably by gay and lesbian activists who were outraged at the 
possibility of not being able to ―marry‖ one another, but only being 
accorded a ―separate but equal‖ status instead.36 On the other side, public 
hearings held in consequence of this Bill led the Chairperson of the 
Home Affairs Portfolio Committee to conclude that ―[t]he public was 
generally opposed to same sex marriages.‖37 Nevertheless, the 
Legislature persisted, and somehow succeeded in tabling a second 
greatly reduced and (at least prima facie) simplified bill for debate in the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces on November 
14 and 28, 2006, respectively. After being signed by the Deputy 
President of the Republic, the Civil Union Act came into operation on 
November 30, 2006—exactly one day before the Constitutional Court‘s 
order would have taken effect. 
 
C.  The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 
 
The Civil Union Act defines a ―civil union‖ as ―the voluntary union 
of two persons who are both 18 years of age or older, which is 
solemnised and registered by way of either a marriage or a civil 
partnership, in accordance with the procedures prescribed in this Act, to 
 
 34. Civil Union Bill, 2006, Bill 26-2006 (GG) (S. Afr.). 
 35. Id. § 1, 4(1), 18(1). 
 36. Janine du Plessis, Gay Activists See Red Over Civil Union Bill, PRETORIA NEWS, Oct. 18, 
2006, at 3, available at  http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=14&click_id=6&art_id= 
vn20061018030414526C988603. 
 37. See Home Affairs Portfolio Committee, Civil Union Bill [B26-2006]: Deliberations, Oct. 
31, 2006, http://www.pmg.org.za/node/8431 (last visited May 16, 2008). 
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the exclusion, while it lasts, of all others . . . .‖38 This definition makes 
provision for the solemnization of a ―civil union‖ which may take the 
form of either a marriage or a civil partnership.
39
 ―Civil union partner‖ is 
defined as ―a spouse in a marriage or a partner in a civil partnership, as 
the case may be, concluded in terms of this Act . . . .‖40 
From the above definitions it becomes clear that the Civil Union Act 
provides for two persons of the same sex to marry one another, and to be 
referred to as each other‘s spouses. It therefore appears that the term 
―civil union‖ is merely semantic and that it has simply been employed to 
facilitate the distinction between marriage and civil partnership. Readers 
of the Civil Union Act should take care not to conflate the term ―civil 
union‖ with similar institutions provided in other jurisdictions, where 
concepts of ―marriage‖ and ―civil union‖ have distinct and separate 
meanings.
41
 
Three pieces of legislation currently govern marriage in terms of 
South African law. Civil marriage is currently available in terms of two 
Acts of Parliament, namely the Marriage Act (which only provides for 
heterosexual civil marriage) and the Civil Union Act. However, as will 
be seen below, uncertainty prevails as to the precise scope and ambit of 
the Civil Union Act. As discussed in Part II.A, the Customary Marriages 
Act allows parties to marry in terms of customary law. A customary 
marriage that complies with the provisions of the Civil Union Act is fully 
valid and equal in status to a civil marriage. Parties to such a marriage 
may conclude a civil marriage with each other provided that neither of 
them is also a party to a customary marriage with a third party.
42
 
Section 13 regulates the legal consequences of the conclusion of a 
civil union: 
 
(1)  The legal consequences of a marriage contemplated in the Marriage 
Act apply, with such changes as may be required by the context, to a 
civil union. 
(2) [A]ny reference to- 
 
 38. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 1 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 39. ―Civil union‖ is defined in section 1 of the Act; however, ―civil partnership‖ is not 
defined. 
 40. Id. (emphasis added). 
 41. For example, in the United States of America the state of Vermont recognizes the validity 
of civil unions which are defined as meaning ―that two eligible persons have established a 
relationship pursuant to this chapter, and may receive the benefits and protections and be subject to 
the responsibilities of spouses.‖ VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (1999). Section 1202 also requires 
that parties to a civil union ―be of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of 
this state.‖ § 1202 (emphasis added). The United Kingdom Civil Partnership Act, 2004 allows for 
same-sex couples to conclude ―civil partnerships‖ which are not referred to as ―marriages.‖ 
 42. Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 § 3(2), 10(1), 10(4) (S. Afr). 
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(a) marriage in any other law, . . . includes . . . a civil union; and 
(b) husband, wife or spouse in any other law, . . . includes a civil union 
partner.
43
 
 
It is important to note that South African law requires persons who 
want to secure legal recognition of their relationships to act proactively 
by either concluding a civil marriage, or, in apposite circumstances, 
concluding a customary marriage or a civil union. If the latter option is 
chosen, the parties are required to take the proactive step of concluding a 
registered civil union that complies with the requirements and 
formalities prescribed by the Civil Union Act before they can be assured 
of securing full legal recognition of their civil union. Failure to secure 
full legal recognition will result in the parties being regarded as mere 
cohabitants and the differentiation encountered between marriage and 
cohabitation (as explained in Part II.A supra) will apply. 
 
III.  INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES—WHAT THE MINISTER SAYS DOES 
NOT MIRROR WHAT THE CIVIL UNION ACT SAYS
44
 
 
By way of introduction, it must be stated that the Civil Union Act is 
fraught with interpretative difficulties.
45
 One of the most glaring of these 
pertains to the scope and ambit of the Act in that, although there can be 
no doubt that the Act provides for persons of the same sex to conclude a 
civil union, the wording of the Civil Union Act is unclear as to whether 
persons of the opposite sex may do the same. 
The answer to this question may not be of paramount importance as 
far as marriage is concerned, as the Marriage Act was not repealed by 
the Civil Union Act and is therefore still available to heterosexual 
couples. While heterosexual persons may therefore have little or no 
practical need for concluding a civil union in the form of marriage, the 
discussion in Part II.A shows that the same cannot be said regarding the 
conclusion of a heterosexual civil union in the form of a civil 
partnership—as the Civil Union Act is currently the only legislative 
vehicle by which cohabitants (who do not wish to marry one another) 
may secure comprehensive legal recognition of their relationships. 
Prior to the adoption of the Bill in the National Assembly on 
 
 43. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 13 (S. Afr.). 
 44. See generally Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1 A–D. 
 45. See, e.g., L. Neil van Schalkwyk, Kommentaar op die “Civil Union Act” 17 van 2006, 40 
DE JURE 166, 168, 172 (2007). Van Schalkwyk states that the extent to which the Civil Union Act 
provides for ―customary‖ civil unions is unclear. The author is of the opinion that the Act provides 
for two types of civil union, i.e., in terms of both civil law and customary law (which he describes as 
‗―civil‘ civil unions‖ and ‗―customary‘ civil unions‖ respectively). 
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November 14, 2006,
46
 the South African Minister of Home Affairs 
remarked that ―[a]s noted in the memorandum on the objects of the Bill, 
this Bill makes provision for opposite- and same-sex couples of 18 years 
or older to solemnise and register a voluntary union by way of either a 
marriage or a civil partnership.‖47 Despite what the Minister says, the 
following observations about the Civil Union Act show that opposite- 
and same-sex couples are, in fact, treated differently under it. 
First, not one single provision of the Civil Union Act contains any 
reference whatsoever to persons of the opposite sex. Sex is mentioned in 
sections 6 and 8(6), but these references are to same-sex couples only.
48
 
Second, section 8(6) of the Civil Union Act states that ―[a] civil 
union may only be registered by prospective civil union partners who 
would, apart from the fact that they are of the same sex, not be 
prohibited by law from concluding a marriage under the Marriage Act or 
Customary Marriages Act.‖49 Section 8(6) creates the impression that the 
Act only provides for persons of the same sex to conclude a civil 
union—if the Act had indeed envisioned civil unions between 
heterosexual couples this provision of the Act should have included 
wording such as ―apart from the fact that they may be of the same sex.‖50 
Third, the preamble to the Civil Union Act
51
 only refers to the 
necessity of providing legal protection for same-sex couples and does not 
contain a single reference to persons of the opposite sex.
52
 
 
 46. Civil Union Bill B26-2006: Adoption by the H. Affairs Portfolio Comm. appendix (Nov. 
9, 2006), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=8509; see also Same-sex Bill gets 
Parliament go-ahead, MAIL AND GUARDIAN ONLINE, November 14, 2006, http://www.mg.co.za 
/articlePage.aspx?articleid=289936&area=/breaking_news/breaking_news__national/. 
 47. Introductory remarks by the Hon. NN Mapisa-Nqakula on the occasion of the Second 
Reading Debate on the Civil Union Bill (Nov 14, 2006), available at  http://home-affairs.pwv.gov.za 
/speeches.asp?id=181 (emphasis added). 
 48. Section 6 states that ―[a] marriage officer, other than a marriage officer referred to in 
section 5 [a minister of religion or person attached to a religious denomination or organisation who 
has been designated as a marriage officer in terms of this Act], may in writing inform the Minister 
that he or she objects on the ground of conscience, religion and belief to solemnising a civil union 
between persons of the same sex, whereupon that marriage officer shall not be compelled to 
solemnise such civil union.‖ Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 6 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 49. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 8(6) (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 50. Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1.C. 
 51. Since 1994 the preambles to South African legislation have often been used by the Courts 
as an interpretative tool. See, e.g., Nat‘l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and 
Others 2002 (4) SA 843 (CC) ¶ 14 (S. Afr.); Nat‘l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v RO Cook Props. (Pty) 
Ltd 2004 (2) All SA 491 (SCA) ¶ 6 (S. Afr.); Nat‘l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v Parker 2006 (3) SA 
198 (SCA) ¶ 1 n.4 (S. Afr.). 
 52. The following extract from the preamble highlights this point: ―[T]he family law 
dispensation as it existed after the commencement of the Constitution did not provide for same-sex 
couples to enjoy the status and the benefits coupled with the responsibilities that marriage accords to 
opposite-sex couples . . . .‖ Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 pmbl. (S. Afr.) (emphasis added); see also 
Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1.D. 
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Fourth, it is submitted that the section 1 definition of a civil union as 
being a ―union of two persons‖ does also not necessarily imply that 
heterosexual persons are included within the ambit of the Act—when 
viewed in the light of points (i)–(iii) above it might be argued that the 
reference to ―two persons‖ was inserted in order to provide for intersexed 
or transgender persons. Indeed, such persons may have been excluded if 
the Act had in fact defined a civil union as being between ―two persons 
of the same sex.‖53 
Fifth, despite the Minister‘s reference to the ―memorandum on the 
objects of the Bill,‖ the fact is that this memorandum does not form part 
of the official legislative text of the Act. Persons who obtain a copy of 
the Civil Union Act therefore do not also automatically gain access to the 
memorandum to which the Minister refers. The suggestion that the 
memorandum provides adequate guidance as to the scope of the Act is 
therefore not convincing.
54
 
Sixth, it is submitted that the saving grace of the Civil Union Act is 
found in section 39(2) of the Constitution of 1996 which requires all 
legislation to be interpreted to ―promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.‖55 This section might be interpreted to include 
heterosexual civil unions. However, the very need for interpretation 
about such an important issue creates unnecessary uncertainty; a 
situation that will prevail until this issue is clarified by the courts.
56
 
The question now presented is whether the Civil Union Act has been 
drafted to enable the average South African citizen or official to 
understand what is expected of him or her. In light of the above 
discussion it is submitted that it has not, and that the Legislature has 
fallen foul of its ―duty to pass legislation that is reasonably clear and 
precise, enabling citizens to understand what is expected of them.‖57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53. See Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1.D. 
 54. Id. at 1.A. 
 55. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(c) (―When interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.‖). 
 56. See Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 1.D. 
 57. Islamic Unity Convention v Indep. Broad. Auth. 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC) ¶ 40 (S. Afr.). 
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IV.  ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTY: ANOMALIES CREATED BY THE COURTS 
AND PERPETUATED BY THE CIVIL UNION ACT 
 
In the decade that followed the advent of a democratic Constitutional 
dispensation in South Africa
58
 it was expected that greater recognition 
would gradually be accorded to marriages that had previously not been 
recognized and to other relationships that may or may not have 
resembled family units. Using the broad range of powers granted to them 
by the Constitution,
59
 the courts have been the primary mechanism 
driving recognition of these relationships. A recent judgment of the 
Constitutional Court illustrates this point. ―It is a matter of our 
history . . . that [homosexual] relationships have been the subject of 
unfair discrimination in the past. However, our Constitution requires that 
unfairly discriminatory treatment of such relationships cease.‖60 
Consequently, many cases involved requests to the judiciary for one 
or more of the personal consequences pertaining to marriage to be 
extended to relationships other than marriage. Very often, the petitioners 
were homosexual people living together permanently,
61
 and, in applying 
the constitutional principles elucidated above, the courts managed to 
adapt family law in such a way as to comply with the values 
underpinning the Constitution. However, the courts are limited to the 
facts of the dispute placed before them, and they are required to ―decide 
no more than what is absolutely necessary for the adjudication of a 
case.‖62 Consequently, such judicial pronouncements have sometimes 
had the anomalous effect of facilitating better legal protection for 
homosexual couples while leaving their heterosexual counterparts out in 
the cold. 
 
 
 
 58. See supra Part I (noting that 27 April 1994 marks the date of the constitutional 
dispensation). 
 59. See S. AFR. CONST. 2006 § 172 (“(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its 
power, a court- (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is 
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; . . . . (2)(a) The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or 
a court of similar status may make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of 
Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional invalidity 
has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.‖) (emphasis added). The Constitution 
also states that ―[t]he Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the 
inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking 
into account the interests of justice.‖ Id. §. 173. 
 60. Du Toit v Minister of Welfare & Population Dev. 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) ¶ 32 (S. Afr.). 
 61. See, e.g., Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) (S. Afr.); Nat‘l 
Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 62. GEORGE E. DEVENISH, THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 209 (2005). 
 419] THE SOUTH AFRICAN CIVIL UNION ACT 17 OF 2006 431 
A.  Anomaly 1: Adoption
63
 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Union Act, the Constitutional 
Court was called to adjudicate the constitutionality of section 17 of the 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 (―Child Care Act‖) in the matter of Du Toit v 
Minister of Welfare & Population Development and Others.
64
 Section 17 
of the Child Care Act allowed for adoption in one of four ways: by a 
husband and wife jointly; by a widower or widow or unmarried or 
divorced person; by a married person whose spouse is the parent of the 
child; or by the natural father of a child born out of wedlock.
65
 
Writing for a full Court, Acting Judge Skweyiya held that this 
section discriminates unfairly against people living together in a same-
sex life partnership. The Court also held that to prevent homosexual 
cohabitants who were suitable to do so from adopting children would be 
in conflict with the principle enunciated in section 28(2) of the 
Constitution, which states that ―a child‘s best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning the child.‖66 Lastly, the Court 
found that section 17 of the Child Care Act also infringed section 
28(1)(b) of the Constitution, which guarantees children the right ―to 
family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment.‖67 
In consequence of the Du Toit decision, homosexual couples are now 
allowed to adopt children jointly. However, South African law does not 
yet allow heterosexual cohabitants to do the same. This situation will 
persist until the ―new‖ Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 is fully operational. 
Although 43 of the 315 sections of the Act came into operation on July 1, 
2007, section 231 of this Act (which will remedy the situation) has not 
yet come into operation.
68
 Section 231 stipulates that a child may be 
adopted jointly by ―a husband and a wife, partners in a permanent 
domestic life-partnership or by other persons sharing a common 
household and forming a permanent family unit . . . .‖69 
 
 
 63. Adapted from Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 2.B. 
 64. Du Toit, 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC). 
 65. Child Care Act 74 of 1983 § 17 (S. Afr.). 
 66. Du Toit, 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at ¶ 20 (citing the Constitution). 
 67. Id. Incidentally, the Court interpreted section 28(1)(b) as guaranteeing the right of a child 
to a ―loving and stable family life.‖ Id. at ¶ 22. 
 68. See Proclamation by the State President (GG June 29, 2007), available at 
http://search.sabinet.co.za/WebZ/FETCH?sessionid=01-41234-1415151403&recno=1&resultset=1 
&format=F&next=law/law_nffull.html&bad=law/law_badfetch.html&&entitytoprecno=1&entitycur
recno=1. 
 69. Children‘s Act 38 of 2005 § 231 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
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The adoption anomaly also illustrates the importance of determining 
whether or not heterosexual couples are competent to conclude civil 
unions. If they can conclude civil unions the application of section 13 of 
the Civil Union Act to section 17 of the Child Care Act would allow 
heterosexual couples to adopt.
70
 If they are not, the position of 
heterosexual couples would become even more unfavourable, in that, 
over and above the anomaly that already exists in consequence of the Du 
Toit decision, it would imply that the couples would not be entitled to the 
application of section 13 of the Civil Union Act and its concomitant 
effects. 
B.  Anomaly 2: Maintenance 
71
 
 
In Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund, D and C were involved in a 
permanent same-sex life partnership.
72
 The parties had ―married‖ one 
another in 1988 by participating in a marriage-like ceremony (that was 
obviously null and void at the time) and they had maintained and 
supported one another throughout their ―marriage.‖73 D was medically 
boarded in 1994 and received a disability pension.
74
 Because the 
disability pension was considerably less than C‘s salary, C in effect 
maintained D.
75
 
After C was killed in a motor accident in 1999, D instituted action 
against the Road Accident Fund (―RAF‖) for loss of support.76 The Road 
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 requires common law liability before the 
RAF can be held statutorily liable for any claim arising from the 
negligent driving of a motor vehicle.
77
 On that basis, the RAF argued that 
it could not be held liable for D‘s claim because the common law action 
for loss of support did not include persons of the same sex. The RAF 
succeeded in the court a quo, but on appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal 
found that the extension of the common law sought by the plaintiff could 
be accommodated along the lines of legal precedent and, furthermore, 
that doing so would satisfy the ―behests of the Constitution.‖78 Having 
found the common law deficient, the Court proceeded in terms of section 
 
 70. Section 13 of the Civil Union Act requires the words ―husband‖ and ―wife‖ in the Child 
Care Act to be interpreted in light of the Civil Union Act. 
 71. See Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 2.C. 
 72. Du Plessis v Road Accident Fund 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) ¶¶ 1, 3 (S. Afr.). 
 73. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 74. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4. 
 77. Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 § 19(a) (S. Afr.). 
 78. Du Plessis, 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) at ¶¶ 17–34. 
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173
79
 of the Constitution which vests the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
the High Courts with the inherent power to develop the common law. It 
held as follows: 
 
To extend the action for loss of support to partners in a same-sex 
permanent life relationship similar in other respects to marriage, who 
had a contractual duty to support one another, would be an 
incremental step to ensure that the common law accords with the 
dynamic and evolving fabric of our society as reflected in the 
Constitution . . . .
80
 
 
Cronjé and Heaton summarize the anomalous effect of the Du 
Plessis decision by stating that ―even if heterosexual life partners 
contractually undertake a duty of support, the surviving heterosexual life 
partner does not have a claim for damages for loss of support, while a 
surviving same-sex life partner has such a claim.‖ 81 
Judicial intervention in the development of marriage-like 
relationships since 1994 has focused almost exclusively on same-sex 
relationships. However, heterosexual relationships have also been 
subjected to close scrutiny. In Robinson and Another v Volks NO the 
surviving party to a heterosexual life partnership requested that the Cape 
High Court extend certain privileges granted under the Maintenance of 
Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 (―Surviving Spouses Act‖) to her. 82 
The facts were quite simple: S and R had been involved in a 
relationship since 1985.
83
 They lived together from 1989 until S‘s death 
in 2001.
84
 During this time S supported and maintained R; she was 
registered as a dependant on his medical aid scheme and the couple‘s 
family and friends accepted them as ―husband and wife‖ despite the fact 
that they were never married.
85
 After S passed away R instituted a claim 
against his estate in terms of the Surviving Spouses Act.
86
 Section 2(1) of 
the Surviving Spouses Act states: 
 
If a marriage is dissolved by death after the commencement of this 
Act [July 1, 1990] the survivor shall have a claim against the estate 
of the deceased spouse for the provision of his reasonable 
 
 79. See supra note 59. 
 80. Du Plessis, 2004 (1) SA 359 (SCA) at ¶ 37 (emphasis added). 
 81. CRONJÉ & HEATON, supra note 19, at 232. 
 82. Robinson and Another v Volks NO, 2004 (6) SA 288 (C) (S. Afr.). 
 83. Id. at 290. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 290–91. 
 86. Id. at 293–94. 
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maintenance needs until his death or remarriage in so far as he is 
not able to provide therefor from his own means and earnings.
87
 
 
The Surviving Spouses Act defines ―survivor‖ as ―the surviving 
spouse in a marriage dissolved by death.‖88 
R‘s claim was rejected by the executor of S‘s estate, on the basis that 
S and R‘s conscious election not to marry reflected ―the choice not to 
have the automatic consequences of the laws of marriage appl[ied] to 
their relationship.‖89 R then instituted action in the Cape High Court, 
where the Surviving Spouses Act was found unconstitutional to the 
extent that it did not provide for persons in permanent life partnerships to 
receive maintenance from their partners‘ deceased estates.90 
As discussed supra, section 172(2) of the Constitution states that a 
declaration of unconstitutionality of legislation by a South African Court 
has no validity until the order has been confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court.
91
 In what may appear to be a surprising move, the Constitutional 
Court refused to confirm the Cape High Court‘s finding.92 The Court 
concluded that it would be impossible to interpret the Surviving Spouses 
Act so as to include permanent life partnerships as doing so would be 
―unduly strained‖ and ―manifestly inconsistent‖ with the ―context and 
structure‖ of the wording adopted by the Legislature.93 The Court 
emphasized that ―[m]arriage and family are important social institutions 
in our society. Marriage has a central and special place, and forms one of 
the important bases for family life in our society.‖94 Thus, the Court 
concluded that the law could legitimately distinguish between married 
and unmarried people.
95
 
Comparing Du Plessis with Volks leads to an anomalous result—
despite the fact that the law did not impose an ex lege duty of support in 
either case, it was clear that in both cases the parties had expressly or 
implicitly undertaken to maintain each other. Nevertheless, the Court 
was prepared to extend the common law to include homosexual domestic 
partners in Du Plessis but refused to adapt the law for heterosexual life 
 
 87. Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 § 2(1) (emphasis added). 
 88. Id.  (emphasis added). 
 89. Volks NO, 2004 (6) SA 288 (C) at 291. 
 90. Id. at 302. 
 91. S. AFR. CONST. 2006 § 172(2)(a). 
 92. Volks NO, 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC) at ¶ 70. 
 93. Id. at ¶¶ 40–45. 
 94. Id. at ¶ 52. 
 95. See id. at ¶ 54 (―In the context of certain laws there would often be some historical and 
logical justification for discriminating between married and unmarried persons and the protection of 
the institution of marriage is a legitimate area for the law to concern itself with.‖ (quoting Fraser v 
Children‘s Court, Pretoria North, and Others 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) ¶ 26 (S. Afr.))). 
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partners in Volks. 
It is noteworthy of mentioning that the issues before the Courts in Du 
Plessis and Volks also serve to highlight the impact of the Civil Union 
Act. This is because section 13 of the Act: (i) will have the immediate 
effect of extending the common law action for loss of support to civil 
union partners; and (ii) will also have the effect of entitling a civil union 
partner to claim maintenance from his or her deceased partner‘s estate. 
It should be clear that the impact of section 13 once again highlights 
the importance of clarifying the issue as to whether or not the Civil 
Union Act provides for heterosexual civil unions. Notwithstanding the 
impact of section 13, the harsh reality remains that the Du Plessis case 
entitles same-sex life partnerships to claim for loss of support without 
having to take the proactive step of concluding a civil union. On the 
other hand, their heterosexual counterparts find themselves in a far less 
comfortable position. 
 
C.  Anomaly 3: Intestate succession 
96
 
 
The Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (―Intestate Succession Act‖) 
provides the surviving spouse and children of a person who dies either 
entirely or partially intestate to inherit the intestate portion of the estate.
97
 
Originally the Intestate Succession Act only catered to spouses who had 
concluded a valid civil marriage that had been solemnized and registered 
in accordance with the Marriage Act.
98
 However, the advent of a human 
rights culture has necessitated a more inclusive and pluralistic approach 
towards intestate succession in South Africa. In this regard, the following 
three developments have recently occurred: 
(1) Islamic marriages: Islamic marriages that have not been 
solemnized in accordance with the civil marriage laws of South Africa 
are not generally regarded as valid marriages.
99
 However, in consequence 
of the 2004 decision in Daniels v Campbell, the surviving spouse of a 
monogamous Islamic marriage now qualifies as a ―spouse‖ for the 
purposes of the Intestate Succession Act and can therefore inherit 
 
 96. Smith & Robinson, supra note ‡, at 2.D. 
 97. Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 § 1(1)(a)–(c) (S. Afr.). 
 98. Gory v Kolver NO and Others 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) ¶¶ 1, 19 (S. Afr.); Daniels v 
Campbell 2004 (7) BCLR 735 (CC) ¶¶ 2, 3, 19 (S. Afr.). 
 99. Although such marriages are therefore invalid, they have, from time to time, been 
recognized under specific legislation such as the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 § 1 (S. Afr.), 
where ―domestic relationship‖ is defined as ―including marriage according to any law, custom or 
religion,‖ and the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 § 195(2) (S. Afr.). The Courts have also held 
that effect can be given to a de facto monogamous (purely religious) Islamic marriage. See Ryland v 
Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (CC) at 707 (E/F)–(H); 709 (C/D)–(E) and 711 (C) (S. Afr.). 
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intestate.
100
 
(2) Customary marriages: In Bhe and Others v Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha, and Others, the Constitutional Court found the principle of 
male primogeniture (according to which customary law of succession has 
traditionally taken place) to be unconstitutional.
101
 It was held that the 
Intestate Succession Act would henceforth apply to both monogamous 
and polygamous customary marriages.
102
 
(3) Homosexual life partners: In Gory v Kolver NO and Others the 
Constitutional Court recently held that the failure of the Intestate 
Succession Act to allow for permanent same-sex cohabitants to inherit 
intestate from one another was unconstitutional.
103
 The Court did, 
however, add a qualification to its order by requiring that such 
cohabitants must have undertaken reciprocal duties of support before 
they would be able to inherit in this fashion.
 104
 
The upshot of the developments elucidated above is that the Intestate 
Succession Act currently applies to most marriage and marriage-like 
institutions encountered in South Africa. However, there is one important 
exception—heterosexual life partners are not included within the ambit 
of the Intestate Succession Act, irrespective of whether or not they have 
undertaken to maintain one another. Once again, this state of affairs 
amply illustrates the importance of clarifying whether or not the Civil 
Union Act allows for the conclusion of heterosexual civil unions. If it 
does, section 13 of the Intestate Succession Act will automatically allow 
the parties to such a union to inherit intestate and the only differentiation 
encountered would be that heterosexual cohabitants who are either 
unmarried or who have not concluded a civil union would not be allowed 
to inherit intestate (while their same-sex counterparts who had 
undertaken to maintain one another would, in light of the Gory case, be 
able to do so). However, should the Civil Union Act not provide for 
heterosexual civil unions to be included, the differentiation would be 
encountered on not one but two fronts as (i) the exclusion of heterosexual 
civil unions would obviously imply that section 13 of the Civil Union 
Act could not be applied to the Intestate Succession Act, and (ii) 
heterosexual couples also would not qualify for the protection provided 
by the Gory case as the case only applies to homosexual couples. 
 
 
 100. Daniels v Campbell, 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) 350-51 (S. Afr.). 
 101. Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) 581 (S. 
Afr.). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Gory v Kolver NO and Others 2007 (4) SA 97 (CC) ¶ 66 (S. Afr.). 
 104. Id. 
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V.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL UNION ACT 
 
The passing of a Bill of Rights that included an express prohibition 
of unfair discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, coupled 
with a Constitutional Court that made it abundantly clear that its task was 
to uphold the Constitution even if it conflicted with the public opinion of 
the majority of South Africans,
105
 made the recognition of same-sex 
marriage almost inevitable. 
When viewed against the backdrop of post-1994 developments in 
South Africa, the fact that the impetus for this development was provided 
by the judiciary and not the legislature comes as no surprise. Having said 
this, one important aspect of the Fourie case cannot be overlooked—that 
the Constitutional Court was mindful of its function to state the law and 
not to make it. 
 
This judgment serves to vindicate the rights of the applicants by 
declaring the manner in which the law at present fails to meet their 
equality claims. At the same time, it is my view that it would best serve 
those equality claims by respecting the separation of powers and giving 
Parliament an opportunity to deal appropriately with the matter.
106
 
 
One of the reasons for opting to give the legislature the task of 
ironing out the intricacies of same-sex marriage recognition was that 
substantial research regarding the question of same-sex marriage and the 
possibility of providing for marriage-like relationships in the form of 
domestic partnerships had already been conducted by the South African 
Law Reform Commission, to such an extent that the Commission ―ha[d] 
reached a position to produce draft legislation.‖107 The Commission‘s 
Report on Domestic Partnerships was the product of almost a decade of 
research, in which comprehensive proposals were contained for dealing 
with marriage (both same- and opposite-sex), and both registered and 
unregistered partnerships.
108
 
 
 105. S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 394–95 (S. Afr.) (―Public opinion 
may have some relevance to the enquiry, but, in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the 
Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its provisions without fear or favour. If public 
opinion were to be decisive, there would be no need for constitutional adjudication. The protection 
of rights could then be left to Parliament, which has a mandate from the public, and is answerable to 
the public for the way its mandate is exercised, but this would be a return to parliamentary 
sovereignty, and a retreat from the new legal order established by the 1993 Constitution.‖). 
 106. Minister of Home Affairs and Another v. Fourie and Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) ¶ 
139 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 107. Id. at ¶ 129. 
 108. See SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 13, at xi–xvi (summarizing 
the Commission‘s proposals). 
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Despite the Court‘s order and the Commission‘s report, the 
legislature did not appear to be in too much of a hurry to give effect to 
the Constitutional Court‘s order. Indeed, the first Bill that was published 
in the Government Gazette appeared on August 31, 2006, a mere three 
months before the deadline of November 30.
109
 This Bill was followed 
by a second Bill that was introduced to the Home Affairs Portfolio 
Committee on November 8, 2006.
110
 Nevertheless, this second Bill was 
adopted by the Portfolio Committee and was sent to the National 
Assembly where it was debated, voted on, and passed on November 
14—approximately one week after having first been tabled to the 
Portfolio Committee.
111
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Despite being in a position to consider (and give effect to) the South 
African Law Reform Commission‘s research, the Civil Union Act that 
came into operation on November 30, 2006, makes it clear that 
Parliament did not do so. Instead, the legislation is poorly-drafted and is 
replete with inconsistencies. Just one example is the fact that the Civil 
Union Act makes provision for the conclusion of a so-called ―civil 
partnership.‖112 On November 8, 2006, the Home Affairs Portfolio 
Committee agreed with a proposal by the African National Congress to 
the effect that all references to ―domestic partnerships‖ in the original 
Bill should be removed and that this issue should be dealt with in 
separate legislation.
113
 However, this proposal was clearly disregarded in 
the final bill. The new Bill (as adopted by the Portfolio Committee the 
very next day and which would be promulgated as the Civil Union Act a 
mere three weeks later) did in fact make provision for civil partnerships 
notwithstanding the original decision to deal with alternatives to 
marriage in future separate legislation.
 114
 
 
 
 109. Civil Union Bill, 2006, Bill 26-2006 (GG) (S. Afr.). 
 110. Civil Union Bill B26-2006: Deliberations on B26-2006 and B26B-2006 Before the H. 
Affairs Portfolio Comm. (Nov. 8, 2006), http://www.pmg.org.za/node/8504 (last visited May 17, 
2008). 
 111. Civil Union Bill B26-2006: Adoption by the H. Affairs Portfolio Comm. (Nov. 9, 2006), 
http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=8509. This was not the final step in the process as the 
National Council of Provinces also had to vote on the Bill. Although the vote occurred two weeks 
later, the National Council of Provinces vote was described as ―largely a formality‖ after which the 
Bill would be ―rubberstamped by President Thabo Mbeki.‖ Green Light for Gay Marriages, 
IAFRICA.COM, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.iafrica.com/news/sa/416904.htm. 
 112. Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 § 1 (S. Afr.). 
 113. Civil Union Bill, supra note 110. 
 114. Civil Union Bill, 2006, Bill 26B-2006 (GG) § 1 (S. Afr.). 
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When all is said and done it becomes clear that the Fourie case 
involved something more than the sole issue of legalizing same-sex 
marriage. In his majority judgment, Sachs J stated that ―whatever 
legislative remedy is chosen must be as generous and accepting towards 
same-sex couples as it is to heterosexual couples, both in terms of the 
intangibles as well as the tangibles involved.‖115 
The anomalies explained above highlight the fact that the drafters of 
the Civil Union Act paid mere lip service to this guideline, and, in so 
doing, promulgated legislation that has perpetuated the almost absurd 
situation of having a legal system that provides gay couples with far 
more comprehensive legal protection than their heterosexual 
counterparts. 
In conclusion, it must be mentioned that the Civil Union Act has 
been described as an interim measure by the South African Minister of 
Home Affairs,
116
 and it is envisioned that South African matrimonial law 
may receive a complete overhaul in the near future. Nevertheless, the 
fact remains that the Civil Union Act has left many questions 
unanswered—a fact which will certainly make both the legislature and 
the judiciary‘s future tasks even more arduous and which poses further 
challenging questions for the fledgling democracy to answer. 
 
 
 115. Minister of Home Affairs and Another v. Fourie and Another 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) ¶ 
153 (S. Afr.) (emphasis added). 
 116. Mapisa-Nqakula Vouches for Same-Sex Marriages, SABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2006, 
http://www.sabcnews.com/south_africa/social/0,2172,139205,00.html. 
